Hollowell: 1990-91 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit

PRACTITIONER'S SURVEY

1990-91 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT*
Douglas Hollowell**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

WARSAW CONVENTION...........................
A. Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Inc.,
917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990); Recovery of money
damages afforded under article 18 of the Warsaw
Convention does not extend to loss of cargo outside
the physical boundaries of an airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland (Rein v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc.), 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991);
Punitive damages are not recoverable under article
17 of the Warsaw Convention even in the case of
willful misconduct by an airline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180
(2d Cir. 1991 ); For the purposes of article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention a ''passenger" is a person who
is: 1) transported pursuant to a contract for
carriage and 2) traveling for the simple pleasure of
traveling or simply to get from one location to
another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland,
760 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); The
"destination" of the passenger for the purposes of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the
Warsaw Convention can be other than that stated
on the ticket, depending on the intended destination
of the passenger..................................

146

146

147

151

153

• This survey reviews significant case law from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, the Federal District Courts in New York and the New York Court of
Appeals decided from July 1, 1990 through June 30, 1991.
•• Clerk for the New York State Court of Appeals; J.D., Syracuse University College of
Law; M.A., University of Minnesota.

Published by SURFACE, 1992

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 8

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

142

[Vol. 18:141

Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Plaintiff failed to show that
injuries sustained due to voluntary intoxication in
flight are within the scope of the term "accident"
for purposes of airline liability under article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention ...........................
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS ......................................
A. Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander &
Alexander Serv., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.
1990); Thirteen business trips to New York in an
eighteen month period were not enough to confer
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under
the New York ''solicitation plus" rule .............
B. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc. v. Lloyd's
Syndicate 317, 925 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991);
Maintaining a trust fund in a New York bank for
purposes of underwriting in New York was not
sufficient activity for a foreign defendant to fall
within the "doing business" provision of New York
jurisdiction statutes ...............................
c. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44
(2d Cir. 1991); The PLO is not a ''state" under the
F.S.LA., therefore it is not immune from suit under
the F.S.LA. and, although politically charged, the
suit did not involve non-justicable political
questions. Additionally, choice of law analysis is
required to determine whether Italian substantive
law governs the dispute and thus whether U.S.
federal or state service of process rules apply .......
D. Posadas De Mexico, S.A. v. Dukes, 757 F. Supp.
297 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); A foreign corporation is not
required to file a certificate of authority to transact
business in New York where its intrastate activities
are merely incidental to its interstate and
international activities ............................
E. Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Germanischer
Lloyd, 768 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y 1991);
Plaintiff did not satisfy New York CP.L.R. § 301
or§ 302(a)(l) and thus failed to establish personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants who had only
slight contacts with New York . ....................
E.

II.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/8

154
155

155

156

156

160

162
2

Hollowell: 1990-91 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit

1992]

1990-91 Survey

143

III.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT .......
A. Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of
the People's Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957 (2d
Cir. 1991); The F.S.LA. requires that courts apply

164

the choice of law rules of the forum state with
respect to all issues governed by the state's
substantive law despite the F.S.LA. jurisidictional
basis in federal court .............................

B.

164

Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924
F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991); United States trust
territories do not satisfy the recognized international
law criteria for sovereign statehood and therefore
are not "foreign states" under § 1441 (d) of the
F.S.LA . .......................................... 165

c. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d

Cir. 1991); Foreign states' issuance of a public debt
instrument in the U.S. is an activity which falls
within the meaning of the "commercial activity"
exception of the F.S.LA. and thus there is federal
subject matter jurisdiction .........................

D.

167

Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F.
Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 858 (1992);
Subject matter jurisdiction exists where the issuance
of debt obligations in the U.S. by Banco Central of
Argentina fell within the "commercial activity"
exception to the F.S.LA. Furthermore, the exercise
of personal jurisdiction did not violate the
defendants' due process rights based on the
minimum contacts test ........................... 170

IV.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S.
LAW .................................................
A. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991); Subject matter

173

jurisdiction exists under RICO and under the
Securities Exchange Act where uncontested
allegations of fraud occurring in the U.S. were
made by the defendants, giving rise to claims under
both acts ......................................... 173

v. ADMIRALTY AND SHIPPING .................... 176
A.

State Trading Corp. of India v.
Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 921 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.

Published by SURFACE, 1992

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 8

144

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 18: 141

1990); Federal courts sitting in an admiralty action
must apply federal choice of law rules .............
B. Fednav, Ltd. v. Isoramar, S.A., 925 F.2d 599 (2d
Cir. 1991); Subject matter of a contract to make
contribution for losses incurred during shipping was
not itself a maritime contract over which federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction .............
c. Seguros "Illimani" S.A. v. M/V POPI P, 929 F.2d
89 (2d Cir. 1991 ); A stevedore is subject to the
warranty of workmanlike service implied by
admiralty law, based upon the stevedore's contract
with the carrier. Furthermore, an ingot does not
constitute a "package" under COGSA, but a bundle
of ingots is a ''package" under COGSA ............
D. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/f Stolt
Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1991); An otherwise
legal and enforceable contract for carriage is illegal
and unenforceable if it is part of an overall scheme
to violate a U.S. law imposing a trade embargo
against Iran ......................................
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES ..
A. David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft,
Ltd., 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 17 (1991); The Federal Arbitration Act
preempts state law on enforcement of arbitral
decisions in diversity actions involving international
commerce ........................................
B. International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y
Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Under the United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitra/
Awards, the court of the place of arbitration is the
competent authority to set aside an arbitra/ award .
c. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969, 77
N.Y.2d 225, 566 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2260 (1991); The New York Convention,
a treaty, ratified by the U.S., preempts conflicting
federal and state law .............................
VII. CHOICE OF LAW ...................................
A. Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales Bolivianos, 756 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y.),
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/8

176

177

179

181
183

183

185

186
188

4

Hollowell: 1990-91 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit

1992]

1990-91 Survey

reargument denied, No. 84 Civ. 4364 (PKL), 1991
WL 79464, 1991 US Dist LEXIS 6111 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Where the substantive issues of a claim do
not arise under federal law, the F. S. LA. requires
choice of law rules of the forum state to be
applied ...........................................
VIII. ASYLUM ............................................
A. Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991); An INS factual
determination of whether to grant asylum based on
a claim of a ''well founded fear" of persecution or
to withhold deportation based on a showing of a
"clear probability" of persecution is reviewable
under the substantial evidence standard ...........
IX. EXTRADITION .....................................
A. Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.
1991); When a foreign court has convicted a person
to be extradited from the U.S., there is no need for
independant determination of probable cause by a
U.S. court. Extradition orders need only consider
whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the
offenses charged are within the Treaty on
Extradition and whether there was any evidence
supporting the finding that there was reason to
believe that the person to be extradited was guilty
of the crimes charged .............................
x. MISCELLANEOUS ..................................
A. International Judicial Assistance ..................
1. In re Request For Int'l Judicial Assistance
(Letter Rogatory) For the Federative Republic
of Brazil (General Universal Trading Corp. v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co.), 936 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1991 ); Evidence may be produced pursuant
to a foreign government's letter rogatory in the
absence of a pending adjudicative proceeding in
the foreign state only if such a proceeding is
very likely to occur within a brief interval from
the time the request is made . ..................

Published by SURFACE, 1992

145

188
191

191
194

194
196
196

196

5

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 8

146

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.
I.

[Vol. 18:141

WARSAW CONVENTION

A. Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Inc., 917 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1990); Recovery of money damages afforded under article
18 of the Warsaw Convention does not extend to loss of cargo outside
the physical boundaries of an airport.
In Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight,• the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the scope of protection afforded air cargo under article 18 of the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air2 (Warsaw Convention) and whether it extended to cargo held
outside the physical perimeters of an airport. Under article 18(1), liability under the Warsaw Convention extends to casualty to cargo or
baggage sustained "during transportation by air." 3 Article 18(2) defines transportation by air as "the period during which the baggage or
goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board
an aircraft." 4 Under article 18(3), however, "[t]he period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transportation by land . . .
performed outside an airport. "s Because the damage to the goods at
issue occurred at a warehouse outside the boundaries of Kennedy Airport, the court concluded that the loss was excluded from coverage
under the Warsaw Convention. 6 Although article 18 may be interpreted as including damage incurred outside the physical perimeter of
an airport while under a contract for air carriage, the court concluded
that the plain language of the Warsaw Convention limits liability to
the actual airport property. 7 Thus, although the cargo at issue remained in the custody of the air carrier at its warehouse less than a
quarter mile off the airport property, article 18 liability did not apply.

1. 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. Id. at 706 (citing Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to lnt'l
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876)[hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
3. Id. at 706 - 07 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(1)).
4. Id. at 707 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(2)).
5. Victoria Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 707 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art.
18(3)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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B. In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland (Rein v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.), 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991); Punitive damages are not recoverable
under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention even in the case of
willful misconduct by an airline.
In In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland, 8 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention does
not authorize punitive damages. This case consolidated two wrongful
death actions brought by the relatives of passengers killed by terrorist
attacks on commercial airlines. 9 The first case arose from the bombing of a Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am) aircraft over
Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, in which all on board
were killed; 10 the second case arose from the hijacking of a Pan Am
aircraft on September 5, 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan. 11 In both actions,
the plaintiffs sought punitive damages under article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention and the Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of
the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol 12 (Montreal Accord).
The court concluded that although the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Accord are silent as to punitive damages, such damages are
inconsistent with the purposes of either agreement. 13
The overriding purpose of the Warsaw Convention, according to
the court, was to limit air carriers' potential liability in the event of
accidents. 14 The limitation was created to provide a more definite basis on which to calculate insurance premiums and to reduce the
amount of disaster related litigation. 1s The court noted that, in effect,
the liability limitation is a trade-off between the carriers and the passengers. 16 On the one hand, a carrier is per se liable for injuries or
death incurred due to an accident on board an aircraft 17 unless the
8. 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
9. Id. at 1269.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Jn re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1269 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra
note 2, art. 17; Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18900, Approved by Exec. Order No. E-23680, May 13,
1966, reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTICS BoARD, AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED
MATERIAL 515 (1974)).
13. Id. at 1270.
14. Id. (citing Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air France, 386 F.2d 1323, 1327 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 - 99 (1967)).
15. Id.
16. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1271.
17. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17).
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carrier proves it had taken all steps necessary to avoid injury.1 8 In
return, under article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Accord, recovery is limited to $75,000. 19 Despite the article 22
liability limitation, injured passengers may recover more if they show
that the carrier engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence. 20
The court based its restriction of article 17 damages to compensatory damages, in part, on the legal significance of the phrase "dommage survenu." 21 Plaintiffs argued that "dommage survenu"
translates broadly as "damage occurred" or "damage happened. " 22
The court disagreed, finding that "dommage survenu" has been properly translated as "damage sustained." 23 This translation had been
relied upon by the U.S. State Department and at subsequent conventions held to revise the Warsaw Convention, where English and
French were official languages. 24 The court supported this interpretation with the later language of article 17 ("subie par un voyageur lorsque !'accident qui a caus [sic] le dommage") translated literally as
"suffered by a traveler if the accident ... caused the damage," because
an accident could not "cause" purely legal punitive damages. 25 Similarly, previous U.S. cases have construed "dommage survenu" as pertaining to compensatory damages. 26 Because article 17 confers
liability for damage actually sustained, only compensatory damages
18. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(1)).
19. Id. at 1280.
20. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1285 (quoting Warsaw Convention,
supra note 2, art. 25). Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or
by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case
is submitted, is considered to be the equivalent to willful misconduct.
Id.
21. Id. at 1280 - 81.
The French text of article 17 provides:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de
toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque }'accident qui a cause le
dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef OU au COUfS de toutes operations
d'embarquement et de debarquement.
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by the passenger, if the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id. at 1280.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1281.
24. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1281.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1281 (citing Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989),
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for actual harm caused by the accident, rather than general legal or
punitive damages, were allowed under article 17. 27
The court also acknowledged that punitive damages are contrary
to the goals pursued by the liability scheme of the Warsaw Convention. 28 First, allowing punitive damages contravenes the goal of encouraging uniformity in the scope of liability and damages. 29 The
availability of punitive damage awards under the Warsaw Convention
based on national laws would defeat uniformity because national laws
differ widely in their allowance of punitive damages. 30 Second, the
availability of punitive damages could make airlines uninsurable. 31
Many jurisdictions proscribe insuring against punitive damages in
fear that it would lessen the deterrent effect of punitive damages on
willful misconduct. 32 Third, with the unpredictability of punitive
awards, an uninsured airline faces exorbitant losses with each accident. 33 Even if the airline had insurance against punitive damages,
ticket prices would escalate to compensate for premiums undoubtably
difficult to calculate. 34 Finally, the allowance of punitive damages
would create a stronger incentive for every plaintiff claiming willful
misconduct to litigate. 3s
The court also disposed of plaintiffs' claim that punitive damages
may be recovered under article 24(2) regardless of the translation of
article 17. 36 Although plaintiffs contended that article 24(2) leaves
the issue of recoverable damages to national laws, the drafting history
and accompanying reports to the Warsaw Convention indicate that
the primary concerns of article 24(2) were the rules of descent and
cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990); In re Air Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 684 F.
Supp. 927 (W.D.Ky. 1987)).
27. Id.
28. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1287.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1287.
33. Id. at 1288.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1282 - 84. Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention provides:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 [baggage claims] any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in
this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall
also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
Id. at 1282 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 24).
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distribution. 37 Because the national laws of descent regarding wrongful death actions vary widely, the drafters left the issue of wrongful
death actions and recoverable damages to national law. 38 The fact
that article 24(2) is silent as to punitive damages is further evidence
that it is not a vehicle for their recovery under the Warsaw Convention. 39 Punitive damages are unique to common law systems and
would have been controversial in multinational agreements. 40 If the
issue had been raised, the drafters would have hotly debated it. 41
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that punitive damages are
recoverable under article 25 of the Warsaw Convention. 42 Plaintiffs
argued that even if article 17 does not allow punitive damages, it does
not apply when the carrier has engaged in willful misconduct. 43 The
court concluded, however, that on its face, article 17 is not a provision
affecting liability within the scope of article 25. 44 No authorities had
interpreted it so. 45 The phrase "exclude or limit" liability has been
extended to article 20(1) (due diligence and impossibility defenses), 46
article 22(1) (monetary limits)47 and has been argued to extend to articles 21 (contributory negligence) and 26(4) (statute of limitations for
baggage and cargo). 48 The court found, finally, that upon demonstration of willful misconduct, article 25 bars the application of certain
provisions of the Warsaw Convention. 49 Because punitive damages
are inconsistent with the goals of the remaining operative provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, by implication they were not contemplated by the Warsaw Convention, even in the case of willful
misconduct. so

Id. at 1283.
Id.
Id. at 1284.
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1284.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1285.
43. Id.
44. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1285 - 86.
45. Id. at 1286.
46. Id. (citing Molitch v. Irish lnt'l Airlines, 436 F.2d 42, 44, n.1 (2d Cir. 1970)).
47. Id. (citing Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 989 (1956)).
48. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1286 (citing 7 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 213 (4th ed. 1990)).
49. Id. at 1285 - 86.
50. Id. at 1285 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17).
37.
38.
39.
40.
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C.

Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1991 ); For the purposes of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention a
''passenger" is a person who is: 1) transported pursuant to a contract
for carriage and 2) traveling for the simple pleasure of traveling or
simply to get from one location to another.
Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp.,s• arose out of the crash of a
Flying Tigerss 2 cargo aircraft at the Kuala Lumpur airport in which
plaintiff's husband was killed. The decedent had been employed by
Flying Tigers as a mechanic assigned to travel on specified flights destined for locations where the carrier did not have mechanics stationed. s3 The demised flight had been scheduled to fly from
Singapore to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and then to Hong Kong.s4
Although Flying Tigers had ground mechanics in Singapore and
Hong Kong, they did not have one in Kuala Lumpur.ss Although
required to be present on their assigned flights, mechanics were responsible for transportation to and from the assigned flights. s6
Mechanics could either arrange for commercial air transportation or
ride on scheduled Flying Tigers flights as off-duty "deadheads. "s7
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that the decedent was not a "passenger" under article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention.ss In defining "passenger," the court looked first
to the scope of article 1 of the Warsaw Convention.s9 The Second
51. 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
52. Defendant Federal Express Corp. is Flying Tigers Corp.'s successor in interest. Id. at
182.
53. Id. at 181.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 181.
57. Id.
58. Id. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides that:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17)(emphasis added).
59. Id. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) This convention shall apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage,
or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise.
(2) For the purposes of this convention the expression "international transportation"
shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in
the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two
High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party
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Circuit noted that article 1 applies broadly "to all international transportation of persons. " 60 A passenger within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention does not require the person to be a fare paying
traveler because article 1(1) specifically includes gratuitous transportation. 61 Thus, employees of an air carrier receiving free transportation not related to work could be "passengers" within the meaning of
article 17. 62
The court further noted that article 1(2) contemplates that "passengers" be transported pursuant to a contract for carriage. 63 Contracts for carriage need be no more than "a promise, an undertaking,
on the part of the carrier to transport the passenger, and the consent
of the passenger." 64 Thus, the Warsaw Convention covers only those
passengers transported pursuant to a contract. 65 The court also considered the common dictionary definition of "passenger": "one who
travels either for the pleasure of traveling simpliciter or for the mundane purposes of getting from one point to another." 66 The court
then distinguished the two requirements of "passengers" under article
17. First, the person must travel pursuant to a contract for carriage. 67
Second, they must travel either for the simple pleasure of traveling or
simply for the purposes of getting from one location to another. 68
According to the court, plaintiff's husband, the decedent, did not
satisfy the two part test because he was traveling on the flight pursuant to his employment contract rather than pursuant to a contract for
carriage. 69 Moreover, the decedent's purpose for flying was to fulfill
his job requirements. 70 Decedent did not board the flight as someone
merely traveling from one location to another. 71 Thus, the court held
that as long as the decedent's presence on the flight was specifically
required, the lack of in-flight duties did not provide him with the staId. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. l(l))(emphasis added).
60. Sulewski, 933 F .2d at 183.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 183 - 84.
64. Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 183 - 84 (citing Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); GRONFORS, AIR CHARTER
AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 60 (1956)).
65. Id. at 184.
66. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1650 (1971)).
67. Id.
68. Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 184.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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tus of a "passenger." 72 Therefore, there was no article 17 liability for
the airline under the Warsaw Convention.
D. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 760 F. Supp.
30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); The "destination" of the passenger for the
purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention can be other than that stated on the ticket, depending on
the intended destination of the passenger.
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 73 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that
the "destination" of passengers for the purposes of establishing subject matter juri~diction under article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
could be other than that stated on the passenger's ticket. 74 The District Court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over an action
brought by representatives of airline passengers killed in a crash of an
airplane owned by defendant LOT Polish Airlines (LOT). 75
Although the deceased passengers intended only to fly from Poland to
New York, they were required by the Polish government to purchase
round-trip tickets. 76 At the outset of litigation, defendant LOT
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Warsaw Convention. LOT argued that because the passengers' ultimate destination according to their tickets was Poland, article 28 of
the Warsaw Convention would not permit litigation in the U.S. 77 The
District Court disagreed.
Under article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, claims under the
Warsaw Convention may be brought in four locations: (1) the domicile of the carrier; (2) the carrier's principal place of business; (3) the
carrier's place of business through which the contract for carriage was
made; and (4) the place of destination. 78 Although the Second Circuit
had previously interpreted the "place of destination" under article 28
to mean the destination stated on the ticket, 79 the District Court held
72. Cf. Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Deadheading" stewardess
aboard employer's aircraft in transport to origination point of ftight to which she was assigned
and having neither in-flight duties on demised ftight nor contractual obligation to be aboard
may have been a passenger under the Warsaw Convention)(cited in Sulewski, 933 F.2d at 186).
73. 7(1.) F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 32.
77. In re Air Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 7(1.) F. Supp. at 30.
78. Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 28).
79. Id. at 31 (citing Petrire v. Spantax, S.A., 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
846 (1985)).
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that the intended destination controlled even if different than that
stated on the ticket. so
The policy of article 28, according to the District Court, was to
allow litigation in countries that have an interest in the litigation or
have unique competency to hear a case because of location. 81 The
governmental interest in the place of destination stems from the passenger having an enduring relationship with that country. 82 That element of governmental interest, according to the District Court, would
be no less where the passenger intended one country to be the ultimate destination and the ticket stated otherwise. 83 Under this interpretation of article 28, the District Court, therefore, had subject
matter jurisdiction based on the destination intended by the ticket
holders. 84
E.

Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y.

1991 ); Plaintiff failed to show that injuries sustained due to
voluntary intoxication in flight are within the scope of the term
"accident" for purposes of airline liability under article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention.

In Padilla v. Olympic Airways, ss the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York considered the scope of the
term "accident" under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and
whether it applied to a passenger's loss of consciousness as a result of
intoxication.86 Article 17 provides that if a passenger proves that the
alleged injuries were proximately caused by an "accident," the carrier
will be liable without proof of fault. 87 In this case, plaintiff became
intoxicated while in flight from Greece to the U.S., lost consciousness
in the lavatory of defendant's aircraft and injured his left arm. 88
Plaintiff subsequently sought compensation for lost earnings and pain
and suffering under the Warsaw Convention. 89 Plaintiff alleged that
defendant caused the accident by allowing him to become intoxicated
during the course of the flight. 90
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, 7ffJ F. Supp. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
765 F . Supp. 835 (S.D .N.Y. 1991).

Id. at 837.
Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17).
Id. at 836 - 37.
Padilla, 765 F . Supp. at 837.

Id. at 838.
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The District Court entered judgment for the defendant holding
that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the injuries resulted from an
"accident" within the meaning of article 17. 91 Although the Warsaw
Convention does not define "accident," the U.S. Supreme Court has
defined it to cover:
an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger . . . . But when the injury indisputably results from the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected
operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident, and
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention cannot apply. 92

The District Court concluded that plaintiff had failed to show the
injuries were sustained as a result of an unusual or unexpected event
and that the injuries likely resulted from his own internal reaction to
voluntary intoxication. 93
II.

JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS

A. Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv.,
Inc., 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990); Thirteen business trips to New
York in an eighteen month period were not enough to confer
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under the New York
''solicitation plus" rule.
In Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv.,
Inc., 94 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that activity of defendant insurance and reinsurance brokers in New York was not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under the New York jurisdiction
statutes. The applicability of New York Civil Practice Law & Rules
§ 301 for finding presence in New York turns on whether the contact
with the state can be considered systematic and continuous "doing
business" in New York. 95
The Second Circuit had previously held that under New York
law, solicitation of business alone will not justify a finding of corporate presence. 96 Applying a "solicitation plus" rule, jurisdiction may
be found where the foreign defendant not only engages in substantial
and continuous solicitation, but also engages in other activities of sub91. Id.

92.
93.
94.
9S.
96.

Id. at 837 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 40S - 06 (198S)).
Padilla, 76S F. Supp. at 838.
918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1043.
Id. (citing Hoffritz For Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d SS, S1 (2d Cir. 198S)).
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stance in New York. 97 In this case, although the insurance and reinsurance brokers had made thirteen trips to New York in an eighteen
month period, the court did not construe these activities as satisfying
the ·"solicitation plus" rule. 98
B. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc. v. Lloyd's Syndicate 317,
925 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991); Maintaining a trust fund in a New
York bank for purposes of underwriting in New York was not
sufficient activity for a foreign defendant to fall within the "doing
business" provision of New York jurisdiction statutes.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the identical conclusion in Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc. v. Lloyd's Syndicate
317 99 as was reached in Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc. 100 After certifying the question regarding the applicability of the New York long arm statute to a foreign insurance
underwriter, 101 the Second Circuit dismissed the action in federal
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 102 Maintaining a trust
fund in a New York bank for the purposes of underwriting in New
York was insufficient activity to fall within the § 301 "doing business"
provision of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 103
C. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1991); The PLO is not a "state" under the F.S.LA., therefore it is
not immune from suit under the F.S.LA. and, although politically
charged, the suit did not involve non-justicable political questions.
Additionally, choice of law analysis is required to determine whether
Italian substantive law governs the dispute and thus whether U.S.
federal or state service of process rules apply.
In Klinghojfer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 104 the Second Circuit held
97. Id. at 1043 - 44 (citing Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 763 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
98. Landoil Resources, 918 F.2d at 1045 - 46.
99. 925 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
100. 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussed in text supra part II.A.).
101. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc. 925 F.2d at 45 (citing N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 301).
102. Id. at 47.
103. Id. at 46.
104. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit had previously granted the PLO's
petition for leave to appeal after the district court had denied the PLO's motion to dismiss.
See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990). The Second Circuit held
that because an interlocutory order denying defendant's immunity claims involved a controlling question of law and one on which there may be substantial grounds for difference of
opinion, it was worthy of immediate appellate review.
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that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is not a "foreign
state" within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(F.S.I.A.). The combined civil actions against the PLO stemmed
from the hijacking of the Achille Lauro ship in the Mediterranean
and the homicide of Leon Klinghoffer in October 1985. 10s Marilyn
Klinghoffer and the estate of Leon Klinghoffer commenced the action
in the District Court 106 against the owner and charterer of the Achille
Lauro, two travel agencies, and additional defendants. 107 Other passengers subsequently initiated the companion actions. 108
Defendants impleaded the PLO for indemnification and contribution, as well as for compensatory and punitive damages for tortious
interference with business. 109 Service of process was attempted on the
PLO through its Permanent Observer at the United Nations. 110 The
PLO moved for dismissal on the grounds that it was immune under
the F.S.l.A., 111 that the case presented a non-justiciable political controversy, 112 that the court lacked personal jurisdiction 113 and that the
service of process was deficient. 114 The District Court denied the motion and denied a subsequent motion for reargument. 11 s Nevertheless,
the court certified the question for interlocutory appeat.116
The Second Circuit first concluded that the PLO did not fall
within the definition of "foreign state" under the F.S.l.A. 117 The
court had previously held that states include "entit[ies] that ha[ve] a
defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the
control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the
105. Id. at 46.
106. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
107. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47.
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id. The court noted:
[I]t remains unclear what role, if any, the PLO played in the events described above.
According to some reports, the seizure was undertaken at the behest of Abdul Abbas,
who is reportedly a member of the PLO. The PLO, however, denies any responsibility
for the hijacking, and maintains that its involvement in the affair was limited to helping
to secure the surrender of the hijackers and to ensure the safety of the ship and its
passengers.

Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 - 1611 (1988)).

Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 52.
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47.

Id.
Id.
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capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." 118
According to the court, the PLO possessed none of these characteristics.119 Although the PLO Declaration of Statehood "contemplates"
that the territory will consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and
East Jerusalem, the mere hope of controlling that territory "does not
establish that it has a defined territory now." 120 More importantly,
the exiled PLO Government in no sense controlled its contemplated
territory. 121 Finally, the PLO lacked capacity to implement the obligations that are necessary to any capacity to enter into formal international relations because it did not control any territory. 122 Thus, the
fact that the PLO had Permanent Observer status at the U.N. did not
avail it of the immunity afforded under the F.S.l.A. 123
The court next concluded that the PLO's claim that the case
presented a non-justiciable political question was without merit. 124
Although the court felt the issues surrounding the existence of an independent Palestinian state injected politics into the case, the fact that
the case was politically charged did not, in and of itself, establish nonjusticiable political questions.12s
Political questions have been found under six conditions: ( 1)
where there is constitutional assignment of the issue to one of the
coordinate branches of government; (2) where there is a lack of standards for resolution of the issue; (3) where the issue is unresolvable
without a policy determination outside judicial discretion; (4) where
resolution requires judicial encroachment on one of the coordinate
branches; (5) where there is need for adherence to a political decision
already made; or (6) where multifarious pronouncements from the
various branches on a single issue is likely.1 26 The court concluded
that the Klinghoffer action was, in substance, an ordinary tort claim
and none of the circumstances typical of a political question were
present. 127
On the issues of personal jurisdiction and service of process, the
118. Id. (citing National Petrochemical Co. v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989) (quoting RESTATMENT {THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

LAW § 201 (1987)).
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 48.
Id. at 47.

Id.
Id. at 48.
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49.
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Second Circuit found that the evidence on the record was not sufficient to make a ruling. 128 Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court
noted that because the action was under the court's admiralty jurisdiction, the law of the forum state (New York) govemed. 129 The only
plausible source of personal jurisdiction under New York law is found
in New York Civil Practice Law & Rules§ 301 which confers jurisdiction over entities "doing business" in New York. 130 Under§ 301,
an entity is doing business in New York when it is engaged in activity
in New York of a continuous and substantial character so as to be
present in the state. 131 The court held, however, that only PLO activities not conducted in furtherance of its status as Permanent Observer
at the U.N. may be considered as a basis for jurisdiction.1 32
In determining whether jurisdiction would exist, consideration of
the PLO's U.N. activities would conflict with prior judicial construction of the Anti-Terrorism Act 133 (A.T.A.) which bars transactions
with or on behalf of the PL0.1 34 Although the A.T.A. bars PLO activity in the U.S., the statute was held not to preclude maintenance of
a mission to the U.N. 13s The PLO's participation in the U.N. is based
on the legal fiction that the U.N. Headquarters is not on U.S. territory, but on neutral ground over which the U.S. has ceded control. 136
Moreover, . conferring U.S. jurisdiction over individuals conducting
business at the U.N. may put an undue burden on organizations participating in U.N. a:ffairs.1 37 The court remanded the case for determination of whether the PLO's non-U.N. activities would provide a
jurisdictional basis.138
The PLO's complaint of defective service of process was based on
process being served on the PLO's U.N. Observer in New York, naming the PLO only by its common name.1 39 Under New York law,
initiatory process served on unincorporated associations must name
128. Id. at 52.
129. Id. at 50 (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963)
(en bane)).
130. Id. {citing N.Y.C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 301).
131. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 50.
132. Id. at 51.
133. Id. (citing Anti-Terrorism Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201 - 5203 (1988)).
134. Id. (citing United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
135. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 51 (citing United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 52.
139. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d. at 52.
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and be served on the President or Treasurer of the association. 140 The
service of process on the PLO in this case would therefore be deficient. Alternatively, under federal law, naming the PLO in its common name and serving papers on its agent in New York would be
adequate service of process. 141 Under Rule l 7(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the law of the forum state determines the appropriate manner in which process is to be served, unless the action arises
under the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.1 42
In cases where foreign law applies, federal law is supplanted and
the choice of law rules of the forum state control the proper method
of service of process. 143 The District Court erroneously reasoned,
however, that because the action was brought under maritime and
admiralty jurisdiction, U.S. federal law applied. 144 The District Court
instead should have engaged in a choice of law analysis as to whether
federal or New York service of process rules applied. 145 Under the
Supreme Court's holding in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 146 even if jurisdiction
has been asserted under U.S. admiralty law, another nation's contacts
with a particular event may be so great as to warrant application of
the law of that nation. 147 The Second Circuit remanded the case,
holding that the District Court should have engaged in a choice of
law analysis to determine whether Italian law applied because the ship
involved was of Italian ownership and the events giving rise to the
action took place in the Mediterranean. 148
D. Posadas De Mexico, S.A. v. Dukes, 757 F. Supp. 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); A foreign corporation is not required to file a
certificate of authority to transact business in New York where its
intrastate activities are merely incidental to its interstate and
international activities.
In Posadas De Mexico, S.A. v. Dukes, 149 the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the New York
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
1985)).
148.
149.

Id. (citing N.Y. GEN. Ass'NS LAW§ 13 (McKinney 1991)).
Id. at 53 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d)(3)).
Id.
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d. at 54.
Id. at 53.
Id.
345 U.S. 571 (1953) (cited in Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 53).
Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 53 (citing Bilyk v. Vessel Nair, 754 F.2d 1541 (9th Cir.
Id. at 54.
757 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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statute 1so requiring foreign corporations doing business in New York
to file a certificate of authority to transact business in New York
before bringing an action did not apply when plaintiff's intrastate activities were merely incidental to its interstate and international activities.ts• Plaintiff Posadas owned and operated hotels located
exclusively in Mexico. 1s2 Plaintiff never maintained an office, employees or a telephone listing in New York, was not licensed to do business in New York and did not conduct intrastate business. 1s3 Plaintiff
did, however, maintain a bank account in New York for the purposes
of receiving deposits from travelers who made reservations at plaintiff's resorts,ts4 Defendants were New York independent contractors
who handled reservations, deposits and marketing services for plaintiff.1ss Plaintiff contended that in the course of its relationship with
defendants, defendants converted deposits remitted to secure reservations at plaintiff's hotels and plaintiff sought $221, 122.31 in compensatory and punitive damages. •s6
At trial, defendants moved to amend their answer 1s7 to assert an
affirmative defense that plaintiff had not filed the required certificate
of authority to transact business in New York 1ss and moved for dismissal.1s9 The court denied the motion, ruling that although plaintiff
maintained bank accounts and engaged in relations with independent
contractors in New York, it was not engaging in substantial intrastate
activity in New York sufficient to trigger New York Business Corporation Law (B.C.L.) § 1312 which regulates foreign corporations doing business in New York. 160 Where, as in this case, the activity in
New York was only incidental to interstate or international commerce, B.C.L. § 1312 did not apply.1 61 The fact that plaintiff's activi150. Id. at 299 n.1 (quoting N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1312 (McKinney 1990)).
151. Id. at 301 - 02.
152. Id. at 298.
153. Posadas, 757 F. Supp. at 298.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Posadas, 757 F. Supp. at 300 (discussing FED. R. C1v. P. 15(a)).
158. Id. at 299. Section 1312 provides in part:
A foreign corporation doing business in this state without authority shall not maintain
any action or special proceeding in this state unless and until such corporation has been
authorized to do business in this state and it has paid to the state all fees, penalties and
franchise taxes for the years or parts thereof during which it did business in this state
without authority.
Id. (quoting N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1312).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 300.
161. Posadas, 757 F. Supp. at 301.
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ties may have constituted "doing business" for the purposes of
personal jurisdiction had no bearing on the applicability of B.C.L.
§ 1312.1 62 Whether the plaintiff had engaged in commerce elsewhere
in the U.S. was similarly irrelevant to assessing the applicability of
B.C.L. § 1312.1 63
E. Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Germanischer Lloyd, 768 F.
Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y 1991); Plaintiff did not satisfy New York
CP.L.R. § 301 or§ 302(a)(l) and thus failed to establish personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants who had only slight contacts with
New York.
In Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Germanischer Lloyd, 164 the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who
had only slight contact with New York. 165 This case arose out of the
1987 disappearance of the M/V Tuxpan en route to Mexico and the
U.S. from West Germany.1 66 Plaintiffs in the action were composed
of 128 shippers, consignees, owners and insurers of cargo lost on the
Tuxpan who brought an action for loss of cargo. 167 Defendant Sietas
was the builder of the Tuxpan, defendant Krupp was the builder of
the Tuxpan's engines and defendant Germanischer, a classification society, certified the Tuxpan. 168 Although Germanischer maintained an
office in New York and conceded jurisdiction, Krupp and Sietas had
no offices in the U.S. and contested jurisdiction. 169
Plaintiffs alleged that jurisdiction over Krupp could be exercised
based on activities of Krupp subsidiaries in Illinois and Ontario. 170
The Illinois subsidiary, however, had not effected a sale in New York
since 1984.1 71 Although the Illinois subsidiary had an agreement with
a company located in Texas to service Krupp products, Krupp contended that the relationship was not an agency on which jurisdiction
could be founded. 172 In addition, Krupp had contractual relations
with a New York company, but no transactions with the company
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 301 - 02.
Id. at 301 n.1.
768 F. Supp 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1025.
Id. at 1025 - 26.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1026.
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had occurred since 1982. 173 In the alternative, plaintiffs contended
that jurisdiction over Sietas may have been based on its employees'
presence in Texas during 1984 and 1985 in connection with repair and
maintenance of the Tuxpan and another ship. 174
Plaintiffs contended that personal jurisdiction may be exercised
over Krupp and Sietas because both were "doing business" in New
York within C.P.L.R. § 301 175 and had transacted business in New
York within C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(l) 176 or that their contacts with New
York warranted further discovery as to the extent of their contacts. 177
The District Court, however, rejected both bases of jurisdiction. 11s
No evidence was produced suggesting that Krupp's contact with New
York companies or the activities of its Illinois or Ontario subsidiaries
resulted in any recent activities in New York. 179 Furthermore, evidence that was presented did not suggest that further discovery would
reveal New York activities. 1so Krupp's only recent activities in New
York were attributable to advertising in magazines distributed in New
York. 1s 1 The court held that solicitation of business alone will not
justify a finding of corporate presence. 1s 2 The court concluded that
no evidence was adduced that Sietas had sufficient contacts with New
York. 1s3
There was similarly no jurisdiction over either Krupp or Sietas
under C.P.L.R. § 302. 1s4 Plaintiffs conceded that jurisdiction may be
found under C.P.L.R. § 302 only when the event or occurrence giving
rise to the cause of action occurred in New York. i s 5 Because there
was no allegation that the Tuxpan had ever been in New York,
C.P.L.R. § 302 could not provide a basis of jurisdiction. 1s6 The District Court also refused to transfer the proceeding to Federal District
Court in Texas since plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that Krupp
or Sietas would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. 1s 7
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1027 (citing N.Y. C1v. PRAC. L. & R. § 301).
Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1028 (citing N.Y. C1v.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. a:t 1028.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Volkswagen, 768 F. Supp. at 1028.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a)).
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FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

A. Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's
Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991); The F.S.LA.
requires that courts apply the choice of law rules of the forum state
with respect to all issues governed by the state's substantive law
despite the F.S.LA. jurisidictional basis in federal court.
In Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's
Republic of China, 188 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether choice of law rules apply to laws limiting liability in a wrongful death action arising out of an airplane crash and whether the District Court applied the correct choice of law rules. In this instance,
the crash occurred in the People's Republic of China. 189 Two American citizens were killed in the crash. 190 Applying New York choice of
law provisions, the District Court determined that Chinese law, including rules limiting liability to $20,000, should be applied. 191
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court decision. The court
concluded that even though the F.S.I.A. is silent as to choice oflaw, it
requires courts to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to
all issues governed by the forum state's substantive law. 192 The court
noted that the goal of F.S.I.A. is to make sovereigns liable "in the
same manner and to the same extent" as individuals.1 93 Moreover, a
court sitting in diversity jurisdiction is required to apply state choice
of law rules when the issues before it are governed by state substantive
law.1 94 A federal court sitting in federal question jurisdiction may,
but is not required to apply federal choice of law provisions. 19s The
District Court was, therefore, not prohibited from applying the New
York choice of law provisions. 196
Under New York choice of law "interest analysis," the law of the
188. 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 958.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959 - 60. In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, the Supreme Court held that "where state law provides a rule of liability
governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in
like circumstances." 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (quoted in Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959).
193. Id. at 959 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1606).
194. Id. at 960 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
195. Id. at 961 (citing Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629
F.2d 786, 795 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)).
196. Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 961.
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place with the greater interest in the dispute should be applied. 197
Typically, this is the law of the place where the accident occurs, unless the parties to the suit are domiciliaries of the same state. 198
Under the New York Court of Appeals ruling in Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of America, Inc., the New York choice of law provisions apply to loss
distribution and limitation rules. 199 Applying the New York choice of
law rules, the District Court correctly determined that the law of
China controlled, including the rule limiting liability to $20,000. 200
B. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237
(2d Cir. 1991); United States trust te"itories do not satisfy the
recognized international criteria for sovereign statehood and therefore
are not "foreign states" under§ 1441(d) of the F.S.LA.
In Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 201 plaintiffs initiated an action to recoup losses incurred as guarantors of defaulted
loans made to defendant, the Republic of Palau. 202 The action previously had been removed from New York State Supreme Court under
the removal jurisdiction of the F.S.I.A. 203 The Federal District Court
entered judgment for the plaintiff. 204 The Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the Republic of Palau, which was a trust territory of the
U.S., was not a "foreign state" within the meaning of the F.S.I.A.
and, therefore, there was no removal jurisdiction under § 1441 (d) of
the F.S.I.A. 20s
In 1947, the U.S. was granted a trusteeship of more than 2,100
islands formerly controlled by Japan. 206 Because the trust was designated a "strategic" trust, the U.S., under the supervision of the U.N.
Security Council, was entitled to full administrative authority. 207
Under the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated
197. Id at 962 (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191N.E.2d279, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972)).
198. Id. (citing Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 457 - 58, 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 335 N.Y.S.2d at
70)).
199. Id. at 963 (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 65 N.Y.2d
189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985)).
200. Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 963.
201. 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
202. Id.
203. Id (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(d), 1603(a)).
204. Id.
205. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1247.
206. Id. at 1239.
207. Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 83). The supervisory functions over non-strategic
trusts are conducted by the U.N. General Assembly with the Assistance of the U.N. Trusteeship Council. Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 85).
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Islands208 (Trustee Agreement), the U.S. would provide for the trust
territory's economic, political and social advancement, including development of independence and self-determination. 209 The Trusteeship Agreement conferred broad powers on the U.S.:
The administering authority shall have full powers of administration,
legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of this agreement, and may apply to the trust territory, subject
to any modifications which the administering authority may consider
desirable, such laws of the U.S. as it may deem appropriate to local
conditions and requirements. 210

Over the years, various islands covered by the Trustee Agreement
have become independent from the U.S. 211 The various islands have
negotiated agreements with the U.S., changing their political status
either to that of Commonwealth212 or free association. The Compact
of Free Association negotiated with Palau which would have shifted
governmental administration to the Palauans had never been approved by the Palauan people. 21 3
The Second Circuit concluded that Palau was not a foreign state
within the meaning of F.S.l.A. § 1603(a). 214 In deciding this issue,
the court relied on the attributes of "sovereign statehood" provided
208. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, Approved by
the Security Council on April 2, 1947, entered into force July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.l.A.S.
No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 (1947) [hereinafter Trusteeship Agreement] (cited in Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1239).
209. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1239.
210. Id. (quoting Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 208).
211. Id.
212. In 1986, the U.S. terminated the Trusteeship Agreement and acknowledged Commonwealth status with regard to the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. Id. (citing Proclamation No. 5564, 3 C.F.R.
§ 146 (1986)).
213. The first two Compacts submitted to the Palauans included a provision that a separate agreement would be entered into to allow the U.S. to locate nuclear devices in Palau.
Under the Paulauan Constitution, 75% of the voters must approve any agreement that authorizes use, testing or storage of nuclear weapons. The agreement did not receive the required
75% approval. The Compact was subsequently renegotiated to allow the U.S. to operate nuclear capable vessels and aircraft in Palauan territory without confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons. Although the agreement received 72% approval, the agreement was
thought not to be subject to the 75% requirement. Aft~r approval by Congress and the President, however, the Palauan Supreme Court ruled that the revisions did not remove the agreement from the scope of the 75% requirement and that the Compact was therefore not
approved. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1240 (citing Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8 - 86 (Sup.
Ct. Palau, App. Div. 1986)).
214. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244. Section 1603(a) of the F.S.l.A. provides
that a " 'foreign state'. . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state .... " Id. at 1243 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)).
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by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 21 s which include the power to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to maintain diplomatic ties with other sovereigns, to acquire territory and to make international agreements. 216 In support of
its determination that Palau was not a foreign state, the court also
cited the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States217 (Restatement). The Restatement defines a state as an
entity possessed of territory and permanent population, controlled by
a government and capable of engaging in international relations. 218
These characteristics of statehood accord with generally accepted international law definitions referred to by the court. 219
Under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, Palau does not
possess the powers of statehood recognized in U.S. courts and under
international law. 220 The full power of administration, legislation and
foreign relations of Palau is still vested in the U.S. as trustee. 221 According to the Second Circuit, Palau will continue as a trust territory
and not as a foreign sovereign until the trusteeship is terminated. 222
The court's ruling leaves Palau as being neither a part of the U.S., 223
nor a foreign state for the purposes of removal jurisdiction under
§ 1603(a) of the F.S.l.A. 224 Since there was no basis for removal jurisdiction, the action was remanded to state court.
C. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991);
Foreign states' issuance of a public debt instrument in the U.S. is an
activity which falls within the meaning of the "commercial activity"
exception of the F.S.LA. and thus there is federal subject matter
jurisdiction.
Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 22 s arose out of a transaction initiated in 1981 in which defendant, the Bolivian government, sought to
purchase fifty-two used NATO military aircraft through an agent in
215. 299 U.S. 304, 318 - 19 (1936) (cited in Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243).
216. Id.
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 201 (1987) (cited in Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243).
218. Id. § 206 (cited in Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243 - 44).
219. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1243 - 44.
220. Id. at 1244.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1246.
223. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
224. Id.
225. 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991).
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the U.S., International Promotions and Ventures, Ltd. (I.P.V.L.). 226
Pursuant to U.S. regulations the entire transaction was subject to approval of the U.S. government. 227 The contract between Bolivia and
I.P.V.L. required that the purchase price of $81 million was to be paid
by forty promissory notes guaranteed by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 228 But, ifthe approval of the U.S. government was not obtained,
I.P.V.L. would return the notes. 229 Notes 1 through 10 were delivered to the Government of Belgium and notes 11 through 40 were
delivered to I.P.V.L. 230 Subsequently, in 1983, the U.S. refused to
approve the transaction and Bolivia requested that the notes be returned. 231 All of the notes were returned except for numbers 12 and
21 through 40 which I.P.V.L. refused to return. 232 Subsequently, Bolivia prevailed in litigation regarding the notes. 23 3
In December 1986, Shapiro initiated an action in the Southern
District of New York against Bolivia claiming that he was a rightful
holder of the notes and seeking payment of their face value,
$1,426,000. 234 Prior to any discovery, Bolivia moved for dismissal on
the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 23 ~ The District
Court granted the motion, ruling that Bolivia's activities did not constitute a waiver of their immunity granted under the F.S.I.A., 236 nor
did it come within the "commercial activity" exception to
immunity. 237
The Second Circuit disagreed. The court held that the F.S.I.A. is
the exclusive source of feqeral jurisdiction in suits involving foreign
sovereigns. 238 The general rule is that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States .
226. Id. at 1015.
227. Id. (citing Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles: Non-transfer and Use Assurances and Congressional Notification, 22 C.F.R. § 123.10 (1990)).
228. Id.
229. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015. The merits of the subsequent litigation between l.P.V.L.
and the Republic of Bolivia are not relevant here. See Office of the Comptroller General v.
Int'l Promotions and Ventures, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Bolivia prevailed in
the subsequent litigation, however, with l.P.V.L. being ordered to return the notes or alternatively pay monetary damages.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1016.
236. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2) - (4), 144l(d), 1602 - 11 (1988)).
237. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
238. Id. at 1017 (citing Morel de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985)).
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except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter. " 239 Sections 1605(a)(l) and (2) of the F.S.l.A. codify the waiver and commercial activity exceptions to immunity:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States ... in any case:
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication . . . [;]
2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.240
The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court that an implied
waiver of immunity could not be found. 241 The court noted that federal courts have construed § 1605(a)(l) narrowly to include only circumstances where the waiver is unmistakable and unambiguous. 242
Such circumstances may include situations where a sovereign has
agreed to arbitration in another country, where the sovereign has
agreed that the law of another country should govern a contract or
where the sovereign has filed a responsive pleading without raising
sovereign immunity defense. 243 The court refused to extend the application of§ 1605(a)(l) to situations where the foreign sovereign initiates an unrelated action. 244 Although Bolivia initiated the suit on the
contract underlying the promissory note at issue, the court refused to
hold that waiver of immunity in a particular action affects waiver of
immunity in related, yet distinct actions. 24s
The Second Circuit found, however, that the issuance of a promissory note inside the U.S. is a sufficient commercial activity within
the meaning of§ 1605(a)(2) of the F.S.l.A. for jurisdiction. 246 The
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (quoted in Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017).
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (quoted in Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017).
241. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017.
242. Id. at 1017 (citing Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d
438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018, 1022 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1990); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir.
1985); L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
243. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617).
244. Id. at 1018.
245. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1017 - 18.
246. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).

Published by SURFACE, 1992

29

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 8

170

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 18:141

court stated that commercial activity under the F.S.I.A. includes
"either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. " 247 Commercial activity carried on in the
U.S. includes "commercial activity carried on by such [sovereign]
state and having substantial contact with the United States." 248 The
court concluded that the issuance of debt instruments in the U.S. is a
commercial activity constituting substantial contact with the U.S. 249
Undoubtably, issuance of commercial debt instruments is a commercial activity. 2 so Whether or not the notes are actually discounted in
the U.S., they are negotiable under U.S. laws. 2 s 1 The court reasoned
that the U.S. has a strong interest in all capital raising activities
within its borders. 2 s2 Their issuance in the U.S. is, therefore, a commercial activity within the meaning of§ 1605(a)(2) and federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over actions for payment on the
notes. 2 s3
D. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201
(S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 858 (1992); Subject matter jurisdiction exists where the issuance
of debt obligations in the U.S. by Banco Central of Argentina fell
within the "commercial activity" exception to the F.S.LA.
Furthermore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not violate the
defendants' due process rights based on the minimum contacts test.
In Weltover v. Republic of Argentina, 2 s4 the District Court addressed the applicability of the commercial activity exception to the
F.S.I.A. in the context of debt instruments issued by a foreign government in the U.s. 2 ss As part of a program to stabilize the devaluation
of Argentinean currency on global, markets defendant Republic of
Argentina, issued indentures through defendant Banco Central De La
Republica Argentina (Banco Central) designated as "Registered
Bonds Denominated in United States Dollars." 2 s6 Argentina's For247. Id. at 1018 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).
248. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e)).
249. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1019 - 20.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1020.
252. Id.
253. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1020 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
254. 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 858 (1992). The district court's ruling in Weltover of January 1991 was made prior to
the Second Circuit's ruling in Shapiro of April 1991, supra text at 111.C.
255. Id. at 1204 - 05.
256. Id. at 1203.
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eign Exchange Insurance Contracts program allowed Argentinean
debtors to repay foreign loans in U.S. dollars by exchanging local currency for dollars at specified exchange rates through Banco Central. 257 As Argentine debts came due, Banco Central had insufficient
dollars to cover the loans and issued bonods and promissory notes to
raise the necessary U.S. dollars. 258 The terms of the bonods provided
that payment would be made in U.S. dollars on scheduled dates in
1986 and 1987 and would bear interest at the prevailing London Interbank rate for 180-day Eurodollar deposits. 259 Plaintiffs held more
than $1,300,000 in bonods. 260
As the bonods matured, however, the Argentine Ministry of the
Economy notified plaintiffs that payment on the bonods would not be
made when due and requested plaintiffs to participate in a "roll over"
of those obligations. 261 Plaintiffs sued for enforcement of the terms of
the bonods, contending that Banco Central was in default. 262 Defendants moved for dismissal alleging that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the F.S.I.A., 263 that exercise of personal
jurisdiction over defendants violated due process264 and that the complaint should have been dismissed under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 265 The District Court denied defendants' motion on each
claim.266
The District Court noted first that although a sovereign's actions
relating to a currency stabilization program may be immune from suit
under the F.S.I.A., the issuance of debt obligations in the U.S. by
Banco Central fell within the commercial activity exception to the
F.S.I.A. 267 The court reasoned that sovereigns do not enjoy immunity under F.S.I.A. when the cause of action arises out of a commercial activity in the U.S., when the act performed in the U.S. supports
commercial activity elsewhere or when the act performed elsewhere
has a direct effect in the U.S. 268 Applicability of the exception turns
on the determination of whether the activities were "commercial" and
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203.

Id.
Id. at 1203 n.1.
Id. at 1204.
Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1204.

Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1208 - 09.
Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1209.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (cited in Weltover, 730 F. Supp. at 1205 - 06).
Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206.
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whether they had sufficient nexus with the U.S. 269
The commercial character of an activity is assessed according to
the nature of the activity rather than its purpose. 27° Courts have construed activity as commercial in nature if the activity is ordinarily
engaged in by private entities rather than sovereigns. 271 The court
ruled that although currency stabilization is unique to sovereigns, Argentina's issuance of debt instruments through Banco Central was a
commercial activity not unique to sovereigns. 272 Thus, the court concluded that the contract cause of action for enforcement of the debt
instruments did not become imbued with immunity merely because
they had been issued as part of a currency control policy. 273
The District Court further concluded that Banco Central had
sufficient nexus with the U.S. to fall within the exception to F.S.I.A.
immunity. 274 The only possible basis under which the court could
find an exception to F.S.l.A. immunity was by finding that the issuance of the debt instruments had a direct effect in the U.S., because
the activity in question did not involve commercial activity carried on
in the U.S. or an action performed in the U.S. in furtherance of commercial activity elsewhere. 275 The Second Circuit had previously concluded that nonpayment of debt payable in the U.S. to a U.S.
company constitutes a direct effect for the purposes of the F.S.l.A. 276
Analogous to the situation where the payee is a U.S. company, when
the payee is a foreign company, nonpayment in the U.S. is deemed to
have effect in the U.S. 277 Nonpayment of debt in the U.S. has a direct
effect in the U.S. regardless of the domicile of the payee. 278 The
choice to make and accept payment in New York through New York
financial centers sufficiently implicates U.S. interests. 279
The District Court additionally rejected defendants' claims that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction violates due process. 280 Applying
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1205 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).
271. Id. (citing H. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 16, 1976, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615 ("if an activity is customarily carried on for profit, its commercial
nature could readily be assumed")).
272. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1207.
275. Id. at 1206.
276. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206 (citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)).

277. Id.
278. Id. at 1207.
279. Id.
280. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1208.
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the "minimum contacts" test, the court concluded that plaintiffs' alleged facts demonstrated contacts sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction. 281 For instance, Banco Central had promised to make
payments in New York in U.S. dollars; the Argentine government
maintains consulates throughout the country; Banco Central conducts other commercial activities in the U.S.; and both defendants
maintain bank accounts in the U.s.282
Finally, the court rejected defendants' arguments for dismissal
on grounds of forum non conveniens because defendants failed to produce evidence demonstrating that Argentina would be a more appropriate forum. 283 Additionally, the defendants did not provide the
court with a list of witnesses they would call at a trial and the witnesses's addresses which have been held to be a prerequisite for a dismissal on forum non conviens grounds. 284 The District Court stated
further that proof of plaintiffs' claims would be predominantly documentary in nature, 285 thus the continuation of the action in the U.S.
would not prejudice defendants. 286
IV.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW

A. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 638 (1991); Subject matter jurisdiction exists under RICO and
under the Securities Exchange Act where uncontested a/legations of
fraud occurring in the U.S. were made by the defendants, giving rise
to claims under both acts..
In A/fadda v. Fenn, 281 the Second Circuit concluded that U.S.
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over securities fraud claims
with a foreign nexus. 288 Specifically, U.S. courts have jurisdiction in
cases which arise out of sales of stock negotiated and concluded in the
U.S. even though such sales occurred notwithstanding a prospectus
given to plaintiffs outside of the U.S. which stated that there would be
281. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (cited in Weltover,
753 F. Supp. at 1208).
282. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1208.
283. Id. at 1209.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1209.
287. 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 638 (1991). In addition to common
law claims, plaintiffs claim violations of§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), Rule lOb - 5 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.lOb - 5 (1990) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
1962(a) - (d) (1988)[hereinafter RICO]. Id. at 476 n.1.
288. Id. at 478.
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no sales inside the U.S. 289
Plaintiffs' claims arose out of stock purchased by plaintiffs in defendant Saudi European Investment Corporation (S.E.I.C.) in 1979
and a subsequent S.E.I.C. stock offering in 1984. 290 Under the terms
of the 1979 offering, plaintiffs were to be given a preference in subsequent offerings, in proportion to their holdings in order to maintain
their relative voting strengths in S.E.I.C. 291 The prospectus for the
1984 offering stated that there would be a 30: 1 split of the shares issued in the 1979 offering, thereby creating 600,000 S.E.I.C. shares. 292
An additional 600,000 voting shares would be issued at $100 per
share, and in the event of an oversubscription, 1,800,000 non-voting
shares would be issued. 293 The S.E.I.C. prospectus specifically provided that shares would not "be offered or sold directly or indirectly
in the United States."294
Plaintiffs contended that despite the 1984 limitation on the
number of voting shares to be issued, S.E.I.C. issued 1,200,000 new
voting shares in the 1984 offering. 29 s Because plaintiffs relied on the
1984 prospectus to determine what purchases would be necessary to
preserve their voting strength in S.E.I.C., they claimed that the sale of
voting shares in excess of 600,000 fraudulently diluted their voting
interests. 296 In further contradiction to information contained in the
1984 prospectus, 180,000 voting shares were sold to Lincoln Savings
and Loan Association (Lincoln), a subsidiary of American Continental297 in the U.S. through an off-shore shell company in the Netherlands Antilles. 298 The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims,
holding that the fraudulent act was the passing of the 1984 prospectus
which occurred outside the U.s.299
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that, among the relevant
fraudulent acts, was the negotiation and sale of S.E.I.C. stock to Lincoln in the U.S. 300 The court noted that the Securities Exchange Act
289. Id.
290. Id. at 477.
291. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 477.
296. Id.
297. Charles Keating was the chairman of American Continental and he was involved in
the negotiation and purchase of SEIC stock. Id. at 477 - 78.
298. Id. at 477.
299. Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
300. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479.
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is silent as to extraterritorial application. 301 The courts, however,
have defined two tests for determining whether a federal court has
subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff's claim under the
antifraud provisions of the securities law. 302 First, under the "conduct" test, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction if (1) the
defendant's conduct in the U.S. was more than mere preparation for
fraud and (2) specific acts within the U.S. directly caused losses to
foreign investors abroad. 303 Second, under the "effects" test, the federal courts have jurisdiction if illegal activity abroad has a "substantial effect" within the U.S. 304 The Second Circuit found a basis for
subject matter jurisdiction under the "conduct" test. 305 The defendants' conduct in negotiating the sale of S.E.l.C. stock to Lincoln,
although not acknowledged by the District Court as acts more than
merely preparatory for fraud, were considered by the Second Circuit
to be conduct material to the consummation of fraud. 306
The court further noted that although Lincoln purchased
S.E.I.C. shares through Lincoln American Investments, N.V., a
Netherlands Antilles company created by American Continental specifically for the purpose of purchasing and holding S.E.l.C. shares
outside of the U.S., this fact did not diminish the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. 301
Similar to the Securities Exchange Act, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is silent as to extraterritorial
application. 308 The Second Circuit has previously rejected arguments
circumscribing the extraterritorial application of RICO:
On its face the prescription [against acquiring an "enterprise"] is all
inclusive. It permits no inference that the [RICO] Act was intended
to have a parochial application. The legislative history, moreover,
indicates the intent of Congress that this provision be broadly con301. Id. at 478 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)).
302. Id. (citing Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983)(quoting
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975))).
303. Id. (citing Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046; Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993).
304. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (citing Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A.,
871 F.2d 252, 261 - 62 (2d Cir. 1989)).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. The Second Circuit quoted the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 416(d) (1987): "The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe with respect to conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related
to a transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the United States." Id.
(emphasis added).
308. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (citing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 - 1968).
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strued. . . . In short, we find no indication that Congress intended to
limit Title IX [RICO] to infiltration of domestic enterprises. On the
contrary, the salutary purposes of the Act would be frustrated by
such construction. 309

The fact that defendants were foreign entities did not immunize
them. 310 The Second Circuit recognized the negotiations and sale
which occurred primarily in the U.S. as the pattern of activity giving
rise to a RICO claim. 311 The federal courts, therefore, have a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction over the RICO claim. 312
V.

ADMIRALTY AND SHIPPING

A. State Trading Corp. of India v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld,
921 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1990); Federal courts sitting in an admiralty
action must apply federal choice of law rules.
In State Trading Corp. of India v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 313
the Second Circuit examined choice of law questions in admiralty
cases and held that courts sitting in admiralty jurisdiction must apply
federal choice of law rules. 314 Plaintiff State Trading Corporation had
obtained in prior litigation a judgment against the owners of the M. V.
Go-Go Runner to recoup for cargo lost when the Go-Go Runner
sank. 31 s Plaintiffs initiated this action against Assuranceforeningen,
the insurer of the Go-Go Runner, for payment of a prior judgment
pursuant to a Connecticut statute which allowed for a direct action
suit against the insurer to recover on judgments obtained against an
insured. 316 The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant, holding that the Connecticut statute was inapplicable in an
admiralty action. 317 The Second Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant.31s
The Second Circuit reasoned that, unlike courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction, federal courts sitting in an admiralty action must apply federal choice of law rules. 319 Following Lauritzen v. Larsen, 320
309. Id. (quoting United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975)).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 479 - 80.
312. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 480.
313. 921 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1990).
314. Id. at 414.
315. Id. at 411.
316. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38 - 175 (1989)).
317. State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d at 411 - 12.
318. Id. at 418.
319. Id. at 414~
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the court resolved the conflict of law issue by "ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws are involved." 321 The court noted that
although Lauritzen has been generally applied in tort contexts, emerging rules for choice of law in admiralty contract actions have been
modeled on it. 322
The contract was concluded in Norway; the vessel was Panamanian; it sank off the coast of Africa; the vessel was en route from
South America to India. 323 The only connection with Connecticut
was that defendant Skuld had an agent there. 324 Thus, under a Lauritzen analysis, the Second Circuit found Connecticut law
inapplicable. 32s
B. Fednav, Ltd. v. Isoramar, S.A., 925 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1991);
Subject matter of a contract to make contribution for losses incurred
during shipping was not itself a maritime contract over which federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction.
In Fednav, Ltd. v. Isoramar, S.A., 326 the Second Circuit held that
an agreement to make contribution for losses incurred during shipping was not a maritime contract over which the federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction. 327 Plaintiff Fednav, a Canadian corporation, leased a ship to carry steel from West Germany to Chicago, Illinois from defendant Isoramar, a Panamanian corporation. 328 The
cargo was damaged en route to Illinois. 329 The marine underwriter as
subrogee subsequently sued Fednav and Isoramar for the amount of
damages to the steel. 33° Fednav settled that suit and paid the underwriter $5,000. 331 Fednav sought contribution from Isoramar for half
320. 345 U.S. 571 (1953)(cited in State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d at 417).
321. Id. at 582 (cited in State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d at 417).
322. State Trading Corp. oflndia, 921 F.2d at 417 (citing Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977)(The
law of the state where the contract was issued and delivered governs.); Healy Tibbitts Constr.
Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979)(The controlling law is the "law of
the state with the most significant nexus with the contract.")).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. 925 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1991).
327. Id. at 601 - 02.
328. Id. at 600.
329. Id.
330. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 600.
331. Id.
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the principal settlement amount plus attorneys fees. 332 Fednav alleged that Isoramar, through its representative, agreed to pay the requested contribution.333 Isoramar, however, never paid the
amount. 334 As a result, Fednav brought suit against Isoramar alleging a breach of the agreement due to Isoramar's failure to pay
contribution. 335
Upon commencement of the action in the District Court, Fednav
applied for, and received, a writ of maritime attachment and garnishment on Isoramar's bank account pursuant to admiralty law. 336 The
District Court subsequently dismissed the action and vacated the attachment for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 337 The District
Court held that the action, though sounding in admiralty, was merely
a breach of contract claim arising under state law. 338
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the agreement to make
contribution was not a maritime contract over which the federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 339 The court stated that a
maritime contract would exist if the direct subject matter of the contract related to the use of a ship, commerce or navigation of navigable
waters, transportation by sea or maritime employment. 340 However,
courts have previously held that entering into a contract as a surety,
thereby agreeing to pay for another's breach of a maritime contract, is
not itself a maritime contract. 341 The rationale for this rule is that a
promise to pay contract damages involves neither maritime services
nor maritime transportation. 342 Thus, the Fednav-Isoramar agreement allegedly breached in this case was a separate and distinct contract not involving maritime services. 343
The court also declined to look to the subject matter of the underlying contract as a basis for jurisdiction. 344 The Second Circuit
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 600.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 600 - 01. The writ was issued pursuant to Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, FED. R. C1v. P. B(l). Id.
337. Id. at 601.
338. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 601.
339. Id. at 601 - 02.
340. Id. at 601 (citing Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 302
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988)).
341. Id. (quoting Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961)).
342. Fednav, 925 F.2d at 601 (quoting Pacific Surety Co. v. Leatham & Smith Towing &
Wrecking Co., 151 F. 440, 443 (7th Cir. 1907)).
343. Id. at 601 - 02.
344. Id. at 602.
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stated that because Isoramar was not a party to the cargo action or
the settlement, the Fednav-Isoramar agreement was collateral to the
settlement agreement and "cannot serve as the basis for initiating an
[independent] action in admiralty for specific performance." 345
C. Seguros "Illimani" S.A. v. M/V POPI P, 929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.
1991 ); A stevedore is subject to the warranty of workmanlike service
implied by admiralty law, based upon the stevedore's contract with
the carrier. Furthermore, an ingot does not constitute a ''package"
under COGSA, but a bundle of ingots is a ''package" under COGSA.
In Seguros ''11/imani" S.A. v. M/V POPI P, 346 the Second Circuit
addressed the issue of whether a stevedore is subject to the warranty
of workmanlike service implied by admiralty law 347 and what definition of "package" should be employed in applying the $500 per package liability limitation provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA). 348 The action arose out of the transport of 8996 ingots of
tin from Bolivia to New York aboard the POPI P. 349 The ingots were
organized into 600 steel strapped bundles, of which 599 bundles contained 15 ingots each, and 1 bundle contained 11 ingots. 350 Upon the
POPI P's arrival in New York, the ingots were unloaded and stored
by the stevedore, Universal Maritime Service Corporation (Universal), under the terms of several bills of lading. 351 After storage for
three days, two containers holding 67 of the steel strapped bundles
( 1005 ingots) were discovered missing. 3s 2
In an action brought by the insurer of the shipment, the POPI P
sought indemnification from the stevedore, Universal, based on an
implied warranty of workmanlike conduct. 353 The trial court held
that Universal must indemnify the POPI P, but given the COOSA
liability limitation, only $500 for each of the 67 steel strapped bundles
could be recovered. 3 s4
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The
345.
1984)).
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
1990).
354.

Id. (quoting Pedersen v. M/V Ocean Leader, 578 F. Supp. 1534, 1535 (W.D. Wash.
929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 92 - 93.
Id. at 93 - 95 (citing Carriage of Goods by Sea Act§ 4(5), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1304(5)).
Id. at 91.
Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 91.
Id.
Id. at 91 - 92.
See Seguros "Illimani" S.A. v. M/V Popi P, 735 F. Supp. 108, 112 - 13 (S.D.N.Y.

Id. at 112.
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Second Circuit reasoned that, under admiralty law, each contract for
services between a carrier and a stevedore contains an implied warranty of workmanlike services upon which carriers may make a claim
of indemnification. 3 ss The warranty imposes a broad range of obligations including the duty to provide proper storage356 and safe equipment, 357 the duty to deliver goods to the right party358 and the duty to
account for the mysterious disappearance of cargo from the stevedore's custody. 359 The court held that stevedores may be liable under
the implied warranty even in the absence of negligence. 360 It noted,
however, that a stevedore can escape liability if the carrier's conduct
hindered the stevedore's ability to perform in a workmanlike man. ner. 361 Because Universal only claimed that it was not negligent in
the storage of the ingots, the court affirmed the District Court's ruling
that Universal was in breach of the implied warranty. 362
In determining to what grouping of ingots the COOSA§ 1304(5)
limitation of liability extended over, the court noted that the limitation applied as a matter of law only after the goods have been loaded
and until they are removed from the ship. 363 In this case, however,
the parties had specified as a contractual term in the bills of lading
that the COOSA § 1304(5) limitation would apply to the post-discharge period and to Universal as the carrier's stevedore. 364 The construction of the term "package" was therefore a matter of contract
interpretation, not statutory interpretation. 365
The court construed the term by looking to the bills of lading as
evidence of the parties' intent, i.e. whether the number of packages
specified on each bill of lading referred to ingots, bundles or numbers
of bundles. 366 If the number of packages specified on the bills of lading totaled 600, for example, then the court could conclude that the
355. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 92 (citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132 - 34 (1956)).
356. Id. at 92 - 93 (citing Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133).
357. Id. at 93 (quoting Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navagazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315, 320 (1964)).
358. Id. at 92 (citing David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 339 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976 (1965)).
359. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 92 (citing Stein Hall & Co. v. S.S. Concordia
Viking, 494 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1974)).
360. Id. at 93.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 93 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e)(1988)).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 94.
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contract defined a "package" as a bundle of ingots. 367 The bills of
lading, however, appeared to specify individual ingots as the number
of packages. 368 Thus, although the bills of lading referred to individual ingots as packages, the Second Circuit rejected that interpretation
and held that individual ingots could not constitute a package under
COOSA. 369 The court had previously held that a package for
COOSA purposes must be comprised of individual units wrapped,
tied or bundled. 370 The Second Circuit proceeded to use the number
of bundles reflected on the bills of lading as an indication of the parties' intent, since a bundle is a package under COOSA. 371 As a result,
the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling which awarded
$500 for each of the 67 missing bundles. 372
D. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 930
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1991); An otherwise legal and enforceable
contract for carriage is illegal and unenforceable if it is part of an
overall scheme to violate a U.S. law imposing a trade embargo
against Iran.
In National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. The MIT Stolt
Sheaf, 373 the Second Circuit held that a legal and enforceable contract
for carriage was illegal and unenforceable because it was part of an
overall scheme to violate a trade embargo against Iran. 374 In this
case, plaintiff National Petrochemical Company (N.P.C.) sought to
recover the proceeds from the sale of chemicals it owned and shipped
on defendant carrier. 37s In April 1980, President Carter signed Executive Order 12205 proscribing the "sale, supply or other transfer, by
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any
items, commodities or products ... from the United States ... either
to or destined for Iran." 376 In June 1980, N.P.C. arranged to
purchase industrial chemicals and supplies through a United Arab
Emirates (U .A.E) middleman, Monnris Enterprises, from Rotex, a
367. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 94.
368. Id. at 94 - 95.
369. Id. at 95.
370. Id. (quoting Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807, 822 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
371. Seguros "Illimani" S.A., 929 F.2d at 95.
372. Id.
373. 930 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1991).
374. Id. at 243.
375. Id. at 242.
376. Id. at 241 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980)).
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German interest. 377 Although all documents called for shipping from
Western European or U.A.E. ports, the chemicals were purchased
from U.S. sources and shipped from the U.S. on the MIT Stolt
Sheaf. 378 The original charter party noted delivery was to have been
in Barcelona, Spain, but did not specify N.P.C. or any Iranian nationals as the ultimate recipient of the cargo. 379 Instead, the charter party
stated that the chemicals would be · discharged to Monnris Enterprises. 380 A subsequent addendum to the charter party, however,
specified a destination in Iran. 381
After the Stolt Sheaf left the U.S. and approached Iran, the IranIraq war broke out. 382 The owners of the Stolt Sheaf invoked the war
risk clause of the charter party and requested that Rotex, the German
agent which was acting through a Swiss affiliate due to West Germany's restrictions on trade with Iran, specify an alternate destination. 383 Rotex specified Taiwan where Rotex sold the chemicals. 384
N.P.C. sued to recover the proceeds of that sale, alleging that the defendants "negligently and conspiratorily allowed Rotex to divert and
resell the chemicals. " 33 s The District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that the contract was unenforceable under the Executive Order. 386
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that although the legality
of the charter party was arguable, it was indisputably part of a larger
"scheme to transport the cargoes for payment of monies between the
U.S. and Iran, without detection in contravention of the then existing
laws and trade embargoes between the two countries. " 387 The fact
that the original charter party governing carriage from the U.S. itself
did not specify Iran as the destination or Iranians as purchasers did
377. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 241.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 241 - 42.
380. Id at 242.
381. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 242.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 242.
386. National Petrochemical Co. oflran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 722 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). The District Court originally held that due to N.P.C.'s status as a wholly-owned entity
of the unrecognized Iranian government, it could not sue in a U.S. court and dismissed the
action. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 242. On appeal, the Second Circuit,
in response to an amicus curiae filed by the U.S., reversed the District Court decision and
remanded the case. Id.
387. National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 243.
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not absolve it of illegality. 388 The Second Circuit had previously held
that legitimate contracts may be rendered unenforceable by direct
connection with illegal transactions. 389 Thus, although N.P.C. disputed the facial illegality of the shipping contract, the contract was
unenforceable due to its inclusion as part of an overall scheme to violate the embargo on Iran. 390 N.P.C. claimed to have been unaware of
the illegal origin of the cargo and argued that it was an issue of material fact. 391 N.P.C. also argued that such lack of knowledge would
allow the contract to be enforced. 392 The Second Circuit rejected
N.P.C.'s claims and held that since N.P.C.'s agent, Monriss Enterprises, knew the transaction was illegal, such knowledge may be imputed to N.P.C. as Monriss Enterprise's principal. 393
VI.

ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES

A. David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft, Ltd., 923 F.2d
245 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991); The Federal
Arbitration Act preempts state law on enforcement of arbitral
decisions in diversity actions involving international commerce.
In David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metal/gesel/schaft, Ltd., 394 the
Second Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act 39s preempted a
Vermont statute on enforcement of arbitral decisions in diversity actions dealing with interstate or international commerce. 396 Investor
{Threlkeld) brought action against a British metal futures trader,
Metallgesellschaft, Ltd. (M. G. ), alleging breach of an agreement to
accurately value the investor's metal futures. 397 Threlkeld and M.G.
had an informal standing agreement under which M.G., a dealer on
the London Metal Exchange, would enter into metals futures contracts on behalf of Threlkeld. 398 The arrangement was governed by a
document titled "Terms of Business," which incorporated the rules
and regulations of the London Metal Exchange by reference. 399 After
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
1983)).
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id.
Id. (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Systems, 599 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1979)).
National Petrochemical Co. of Iran, 930 F.2d at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244 (quoting Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 689 n.9 (2d Cir.
923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991).
Id. at 248 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 15).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 246.
David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 247.
Id.
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three years, Threlkeld and M. G. entered another agreement under
which M.G. would accurately ascertain the value of Threlkeld's futures contracts. 400 Upon being confronted with a $1.7 million margin
call from M.G., Threlkeld sought an independent valuation of its futures contracts and discovered that M.G. had systematically overvalued Threlkeld's position. 401
Threlkeld initiated the action in the Federal District Court for
Vermont for losses allegedly incurred as a result of M.G.'s systematic
overvaluation. 402 M.G. moved to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to the "Terms of Business" which incorporated the
London Metal Exchange Rules which contain two arbitration provisions. 403 The District Court treated it as a summary judgment motion
and denied it. 404
The Second Circuit held that the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause implicit in the Terms of Business document. 40s
Although Vermont law406 voids any arbitration clause not explicitly
agreed to by the parties, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state
law. 407 Under Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 408 the
Federal Arbitration Act applies in federal courts sitting in diversity
suits relating to interstate or international commerce. 409 Unlike the
restrictive Vermont law, the Federal Arbitration Act requires only
that the agreement to arbitrate be in writing. 410 Since the London
Metal Exchange rules on arbitration were incorporated in the "Terms
of Business," they are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration
Act. 411 The Second Circuit, therefore, concluded that defendant M.G.
was entitled to a stay of proceedings.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 248.
403. Id. at 247 (quoting The London Metal Exchange Rules, Part 4, Rule 10.1 and Part
8, Rule 1.1).
404. Id. at 246.
405. Id. at 249.
406. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 5652(b)
(1989)).
407. Id. at 249 - 50.
408. 388 U.S. 395 (1961)(cited in David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249).
409. David L. Threlkeld & Co., 923 F.2d at 249 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg., Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967)).
410. Id. at 249 - 50. Vermont law requires that any agreement to arbitrate be displayed
prominently in the contract and be signed by the parties. Id. at 249 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 § 5652(b)).
411. Id. at 250.
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B. International Standard Blee. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Under the United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitra/ Awards, the court
of the place of arbitration is the competent authority to set aside an
arbitra/ award.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petro/era, Industrial Y Comercial, 412 held that under the
United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards413 (New York Convention), only the courts of
the situs of the arbitration are competent to review the arbitration and
thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review an arbitral
decision rendered in Mexico City. 414 Petitioner International Standard Electric Corp. (I.S.E.C.) sought to vacate an arbitral award rendered against it and in favor of respondent Bridas, a shareholder in
I.S.E.C.'s wholly-owned Argentine subsidiary, Compania Standard
Electric Argentina S.A. (C.S.E.A.), by an arbitral panel in Mexico
City under the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce (I.C.C.). 41 ~ Bridas sought dismissal of I.S.E.C.'s action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and sought enforcement of the
arbitral award. 416
Arbitration was held in Mexico pursuant to an arbitration clause
in the shareholders agreement between I.S.E.C. and Bridas which required that all disputes be resolved through arbitration under the
I.C.C. aegis. 417 Bridas had alleged fraud by I.S.E.C. in connection
with the sale of C.S.E.A. stock to Bridas, claiming I.S.E.C. mismanaged C.S.E.A. and that I.S.E.C. had breached its fiduciary obligations
to Bridas. 418 The arbitral panel found for Bridas on the breach of
fiduciary obligations claims, and awarded damages of $6, 793,000 with
interest compounded annually at 12%, legal fees in the amount of
$1,000,000 and costs in the amount of $400,000.419
412. 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
413. Id. at 173 (citing United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed New York City June 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.l.A.S. No.
6997, United States ratification 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 208) [hereinafter New York Convention].
414. Id. at 178.
415. Id. at 173 - 75.
416. International Standard Elec. Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 175.
417. Id. at 174.
418. Id. at 175.
419. Id.
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The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
vacate the arbitral decision under the New York Convention. 420
Under article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention, an application for
review of an arbitral award can be made only to the courts or competent authority of the country in which or under whose laws the award
was made. 421 Contrary to petitioner's argument that article V(l)(e)
conferred jurisdiction on the courts of the country whose substantive
law governs the dispute, the court held that it is the courts of the
country whose procedural laws control that have jurisdiction to review the arbitral decision. 422 Although U.S. substantive law governed
the arbitration, the suggestion that U.S. courts have jurisdiction defies
the intent of the New York Convention to accommodate the procedurally diverse arbitral systems of the international community. 423
The District Court noted that decisions of foreign courts deciding
cases which have arisen under the New York Convention support the
view that article V(l)(e) confers jurisdiction on the country whose
procedural laws apply. 424 The District Court concluded that article
V(l)(e) confers jurisdiction to review the award on the courts of Mexico. 42s The court thus dismissed the motion to vacate the award for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted the petition to enforce
the arbitral award. 426
C. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969, 77 N.Y.2d 225,
566 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2260 (1991); The
New York Convention, a treaty, ratified by the U.S., preempts
conflicting federal and state law.
In Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 427 the Court of Appeals of New
York ruled that although the New York Convention preempts conflicting federal and state laws, New York Insurance Law article 74,
authorizing the State Superintendent of Insurance to sue on behalf on
420. International Standard Blee. Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 178.
421. Id. at 176.
422. Id. at 177.
423. Id.
424. International Standard Blee. Corp., 745 F. Supp. at 177 - 78.
425. Id. at 178.
426. Id. at 182. After dismissing petitioner's action to dismiss the vacatur action, the
court granted respondent's cross-motion to enforce the Mexican arbitral decision. The court
concluded that because petitioner had failed to prove any of the defenses to enforcement under
the New York Convention, the court was compelled to enforce the award under article V of
the New York Convention. Id.
427. 567 N.B.2d 969, 77 N.Y.2d 225, 566 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2260 (1991).
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insolvent insurance companies, is not preempted by the New York
Convention. 428
Plaintiff Superintendent of Insurance sued the defendant reinsurer on behalf of the defunct Nassau Insurance Company. 429 Nassau
was owned by defendants Jeanne and Richard DiLoreto who also
owned defendant Ardra Insurance Co., a Bermuda corporation. 430
Nassau and Ardra had entered into three international reinsurance
agreements, each of which contained an arbitration clause. 431 Nassau
subsequently became defunct and plaintiff initiated liquidation under
New York Insurance Law article 74. 432 Plaintiff sued on behalf of
Nassau for recovery of reinsurance proceeds due under the reinsurance contracts after Ardra repudiated the agreements. 433 Defendants
moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses included in the agreements, arguing that the arbitration
clauses were entitled to enforcement under the New York
Convention. 434
The New York Court of Appeals agreed that the New York Convention preempts conflicting state law, but held that the case came
within one of the exceptions to enforcement of an arbitration
clause. 43 s Since the New York Convention was a treaty entered into
by the U.S., it preempts conflicting state law pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 436 The New York Convention requires enforcement of an arbitral agreement when it covers
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 437 Courts in signatory nations may refuse to submit disputes to arbitration if the arbitration agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed. 438 Under the New York Insurance Law, however, the Superintendent had not been granted the power to arbitrate claims and
428. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 970, 77 N.Y.2d at 228, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (citing New
York Convention, supra note 413).
429. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 229, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
430. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 228, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
431. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 228, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
432. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 970, 77 N.Y.2d at 228 - 29, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
433. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 229, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
434. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 229, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
435. Id. at 972 - 73, 77 N.Y.2d at 231 - 34, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 - 79.
436. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 971, 77 N.Y.2d at 230, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
437. Id. at 972, 77 N.Y.2d at 231, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (citing New York Convention,
supra note 413, art. II).
438. Id., 77 N.Y.2d at 231, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (citing New York Convention, supra
note 413, art. II).
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must resort to state court litigation. 439 As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that claims by the Superintendent under New York
Insurance Law article 74 are not arbitrable under the New York Convention because "the arbitration clause and the dispute alleged to be
subject to it are not capable of performance and settlement under the
law of New York."440
VII.

CHOICE OF LAW

A. Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales
Bolivianos, 756 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y.), reargument denied, No.
84 Civ. 4364 (PKL), 1991 WL 79464, 1991 US Dist LEXIS 6111
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Where the substantive issues of a claim do not
arise under federal law, the F.S.LA. requires choice of law rules of
the forum state to be applied.
In Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos,441 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held: 1) that Bolivian contract law. governed a dispute
over a contract entered into by a Bolivian government procurement
agency442 and 2) that defendant failed to prove that under Bolivian
law the absence of a forum selection clause, conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Bolivian courts, made the contract unenforceable. 443
The court also refused to enforce an exclusive forum selection clause
implied by Bolivian law. 444 Walpex Trading Co. (Walpex) is an
American export company which allegedly had entered into a contract with defendant Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos
(Y.F.P.B.), an agency of the Bolivian government, for the sale of piping to be used by the Bolivian oil industry. 44s Defendant, Y.P.F.B.,
had placed an invitation for bids in various Bolivian newspapers. 446
In addition to providing a general description of the piping sought,
the invitation referred to specifications that would be provided by
Y.F.P.B. upon request. 447 These specifications included statements
that the bidding would be governed by Y.F.P.B. regulations and that
439. Id. at 972 - 73, 77 N.Y.2d at 232 - 233, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 578 - 79.
440. Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 973, 77 N.Y.2d at 234, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
441. 756 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y.), reargument denied, No. 84 Civ. 4364 (PKL), 1991 WL
79464, 1991 US Dist. 6111 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
442. Id. at 142.
443. Id. at 143.
444. Id.
445. Walpex Trading Co, 756 F. Supp. at 137 - 38.
446. Id. at 138.
447. Id.
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presentation of a bid implies submission to the laws and jurisdiction of
Bolivia. 448 The Y.F.P.B. regulations further provided that all contracts with foreign organizations must contain an express clause subjecting all issues emerging from the contract to the laws of Bolivia and
the jurisdiction of its courts. 449 Walpex submitted a bid through its
Bolivian sales agent, Compania de Representaciones Internacionales,
S.R.L., and was eventually awarded the contract on April 7, 1982.450
During the next 15 months, numerous extensions were requested by
Y .F .P.B. regarding the deadline for full payment of the purchase price
of the piping. On July 28, 1983, Y.F.P.B. formally repudiated the
contract. 451
Plaintiff Walpex initiated an action for breach of contract alleging that the acceptance of the bid formed an enforceable contract and
additionally that it had entered supply contracts and had undertaken
a performance bond as required by Y.F.P.B. in reliance on Y.F.P.B.'s
acceptance of the bid. 452 Defendant moved for summary judgment
and dismissal contending that no enforceable contract existed in the
absence of a written agreement, and that even if an enforceable contract existed, by implication it included the choice of law and choice
of forum clauses stating that Bolivian law controls and Bolivian
courts have exclusive jurisdiction.453 In the alternative, defendant argued that even in the absence of an enforceable choice of forum
clause, Bolivian law required dismissal of the action since it was a
contract with a foreign party that did not contain the required choice
of forum clause. 454
The District Court denied defendant's motions for summary
judgment and dismissal, but held that Bolivian law governed the dispute. 455 When the substantive claim does not arise under federal law,
the F.S.l.A. requires U.S. courts to apply the choice of law rules of
the forum state. 456 Under New York choice of law analysis, the law
of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation controls
448. Id
449. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 138.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id The court had previously determined it had subject matter jurisdiction under the
F.S.l.A. Id. (citing Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 712
F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
453. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 139.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 139 - 42.
456. Id. at 140.
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the dispute. 457 The court concluded that since Bolivia has greater
contacts with the action and Bolivia has the paramount interest in
having its law control, the law of Bolivia controls. 458 All of the events
underlying formation of the contract took place in Bolivia and virtually all of its performance was to take place in Bolivia. 459 The only
contacts with the forum state of the litigation, New York, were the
plaintiff's residency and the performance bond, which was issued by a
New York bank. 460
However, the court declined to find that the contract included an
enforceable forum selection clause. 461 Although the Supreme Court
had previously held that forum selection clauses should be given effect
when freely negotiated and where there are no signs of fraud, duress,
undue influence or overwhelming bargaining power, 462 the District
Court declined to pass on the validity of the forum selection clause
alleged by defendants since it was not codified in a document. 463 In
fact, the court noted that in the absence of any written document, the
court could not pass on the validity of an exclusive forum clause that
would have or should have been included in such a document. 464 The
court thus denied defendant's motion on exclusive forum grounds. 465
The court further denied the motions for summary judgment and
dismissal on the grounds that Bolivian law would not give effect to the
contract. 466 The court reasoned that although defendants presented
an affidavit of a Bolivian law expert stating that Bolivian courts would
not enforce a contract that did not include choice of forum and choice
of law clauses, defendants did not provide evidence that the contract
would be unenforceable under Bolivian law where there were allegations of bad faith which induced the plaintiff to rely on the acceptance
of the bid. 467

457. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 140 (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,
480 N.E.2d 679, 684, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 197, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 95 (1985)).
458. Id. at 142.
459. Id. at 140.
460. Id.
461. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 143.
462. Id. at 142 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Walpex Trading Co., 756 F. Supp. at 142.
466. Id. at 143.
467. Id.
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ASYLUM

A. Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211 (2d
Cir. 1991); An INS factual determination of whether to grant
asylum based on a claim of a "well founded fear" of persecution or
to withhold deportation based on a showing of a "clear probability"
of persecution is reviewable under the substantial evidence standard.
The facts in Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 468 concerned the controversial area of asylum for El Salvadoran aliens
claiming persecution due to threats from death squads and the military. The Second Circuit considered the standard the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Board of Immigration
Appeals (Board of Appeals) applies to an applicant's request for a
grant of asylum. 469 Additionally, the Second Circuit elaborated on
the standard of review for Board of Appeals determinations on withholding of deportation. 410
Petitioner, the asylum applicant, was a forty year old native of El
Salvador who has resided in the U.S. since 1984.471 While in El Salvador, petitioner had been active in the La Uno party working for free
elections in El Salvador and for the election of Salvadoran President
Duarte. 472 From 1974 to 1982, petitioner alleges he was threatened
repeatedly by government security forces, compelling him to leave his
family and constantly move around El Salvador. 473 Many of his colleagues from La Uno were jailed, murdered or had disappeared. 474
Petitioner's brother and wife had both been murdered. 475 Members of
church organizations familiar with the El Salvadoran death squads
testified before an INS judge about these activities. 476 Petitioner came
to the U.S. illegally in 1982 and was deported to El Salvador. 477 After
more threats to his personal safety, petitioner returned to the U.S. in
1984.478
Both the INS judge and the Board of Appeals denied the petition
for asylum and the request to withhold deportation. 479 The Board of
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

926 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1991).

Id. at 214 - 16.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 213.
Melendez, 926 F.2d at 213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Melendez, 926 F.2d at 213.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 213 - 214.
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Appeals decided that under § 208(a) and § 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act480 (I.N.A.) petitioner had failed to demonstrate a
"well founded fear" of persecution as required for a grant of asylum481 or a "clear probability" of persecution required for withholding deportation. 482 In particular, the Board of Appeals found that
petitioner had failed to demonstrate a connection between his brother
and wife's deaths, on the one hand, and claimed threats of persecution
against petitioner on the other. 483 The Board of Appeals also found
that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he was threatened or the
nature of the alleged threats. 484 The Second Circuit reversed and
granted the petition. 48 s
Granting asylum under § 208(a) of the I.N.A. is two-step process. 486 First, the petitioner must demonstrate a "well founded fear"
of persecution in his/her native land. 487 Second, the petitioner must
seek asylum which may be granted at the discretion of the Attorney
General. 488 The Supreme Court has held that the "well founded fear"
standard might be satisfied upon a showing that persecution was a
"reasonable possibility."489 Similarly, the Second Circuit has previously held that the standard is satisfied upon demonstration that a
reasonable person would fear persecution if returned to his or her native country. 490 This standard involves both subjective proof that the
petitioner fears persecution and an objective showing that the fear is
reasonable. 491 Proof of the objective component may include documentary evidence of future persecution492 or credible oral testimony
480. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103 - 1525, § 1158(a),
§ 1253(h)(l) (1991) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 213 - 14).
481. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 208(a) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at
213 - 14).
482. Id. at § 243(h) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 218).
483. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 219 - 20.
486. Section 208(a) confers discretion on the Attorney General to grant asylum to refugees. A refugee is:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ... who is unable or
unwilling to return to ... that country because of persecution or a well founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § l 101(a)(42)(A) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214).
487. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act§ 208(a)).
488. Id. at 215 (citing Carcamo - Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1986)).
489. Id. (citing INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 424 - 25 (1984)).
490. Id. (citing Carcamo - Flores, 805 F.2d at 68).
491. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215.
492. Id. (citing Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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that petitioner has good reason to fear being singled-out for persecution. 493 The court concluded that the Board of Appeals correctly applied the reasonable person standard in determining whether there
was a "well founded fear" of persecution for which asylum may be
granted. 494
In the alternative to the§ 208(a) claims, petitioner also raised an
I.N.A. § 243(h)49s claim that withholding of deportation was
mandatory. 496 The standard of proof under§ 243(h) is materially different than that under§ 208(a). 497 Section 243(h) requires a demonstration that there is a "clear probability," or it is "more likely than
not," that the alien would be subject to persecution. 498 The Board of
Appeals in this case was therefore correct in applying the "more likely
than not" standard to petitioner's claim under § 243(h) to withhold
deportation. 499
In addition to addressing whether the Board of Appeals applied
the correct standards, the court also discussed the standard of review
to which a Board of Appeals determination would be held. The Second Circuit's analysis of the standard of review applied to a Board of
Appeals determination under § 208(a) differentiated between a fact
finding components00 and a discretionary component. sm The purely
factual determination of whether there is a "well founded fear" of
persecution is reviewable under the substantial evidence standard articulated under§ 106(a)(4) of the I.N.A.s02 The discretionary component is only reviewable for abuse of discretion.so3 Under § 243(h),
however, the Board of Appeals only makes a factual determination of
493. Id at 215 (citing Del Valle, 776 F.2d at 1411 (quoting Cardozo - Fonseca v. INS,
767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987))).
494. Id
495. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215. Section 243(h) provides that:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(hXl) (cited in Melendez, 926 F.2d at 214).
496. Id at 215.
497. Id.
498. Id (citing INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 424 - 25 (1984)).
499. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 215.
500. Id The fact component relates to the Board of Appeal's determination of whether
the applicant is a refugee for asylum purposes.
501. Id at 216. The discretionary component is associated with the ultimate grant or
denial of asylum.
502. Id. at 216 (citing 8 U.S.C. § l 105a(aX4)).
503. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 218.
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whether there is a clear probability of persecution. s04 Its determination is therefore to be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. sos The court concluded that petitioner had sufficiently
demonstrated probability of persecution to trigger the withholding of
deportation under § 243(h). s06 The court specifically rejected the reasoning employed by the Board of Appeals that because threats by El
Salvadoran death squads are common among members of political organizations in that country, petitioner's claim did not demonstrate a
unique level of fear and did not warrant asylum or a stay of deportation. so7 Instead of undercutting a claim for asylum, objective evidence of violent conditions in a country is especially probative of a
"well founded fear" of persecution. sos Thus, the court remanded the
case to INS for a new hearing to reevaluate whether petitioner could
satisfy the "clear probability" of persecution standard for withholding
deportation. s09
IX.

EXTRADITION

A. Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991); When a
foreign court has convicted a person to be extradited from the U.S.,
there is no need for independant determination of probable cause by
a U.S. court. Extradition orders need only consider whether the
magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offenses charged are within
the Treaty on Extradition and whether there was any evidence
supporting the finding that there was reason to believe that the person
to be extradited was guilty of the crimes charged.
In Spatola v. United States,sto the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court's ruling on an extradition request from Italy.m The
party to be extradited, the relator, had been convicted in Italian
courts for drug trafficking and related currency offenses in 1983.s 12
Spatola, the relator in this action, had been imprisoned, but was released while his appeal in the Italian courts was pending.s 13 While his
appeal was pending on the earlier charges, Spatola was convicted by
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 219.
507. Melendez, 926 F.2d at 219. The Attorney General has discretion with respect to
whether grant asylum, but does not have discretion regarding the withholding of deportation.
508. Id. at 211.
509. Id. at 220.
510. 925 F.2d 615 (1991).
511. Id. at 618.
512. Id. at 617.
513. Id.
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an Italian court of bribing a public official. 514 He then fled to the
U.S. 515 Upon learning of his presence in the U.S., the Italian Government made a formal request for his extradition. 516 After a hearing,
the U.S. Magistrate found that Spatola was extraditable under the
Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Republic of ltaly517 (Treaty on Extradition). The Magistrate concluded that there was probable cause to believe Spatola committed the offenses in Italy for which he was
charged, and that since the offenses were criminal in the U.S. as well,
the dual criminality requirement of the Treaty on Extradition was satisfied. 518 Spatola subsequently brought an action for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the Magistrate's order to extradite. The District
Court denied Spatola's request for habeas corpus relief. 519
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas
corpus relief. 52° First, the court noted that although orders certifying
request for extradition are not final decisions of the court and hence
non-appealable, a relator may obtain limited review of extradition orders by seeking a writ of habeas corpus. 521 The scope of review is
confined to whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offenses charged are within the Treaty on Extradition and whether
there was any evidence supporting the finding that there was reason to
believe that the relator is guilty of the crimes charged. 522
Spatola contended that the Magistrate erred in finding probable
cause to believe he committed the offenses in Italy based on an analysis of the Italian appellate court order affirming his earlier convictions
of drug trafficking. 523 The Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court's holding that there need be no independent basis for finding
probable cause. 524 To rule that a conviction, after a trial at which the
relator was present and represented by counsel, does not constitute
probable cause would require magistrates to substitute their judgment
514. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 617.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic ofltaly, Oct. 13, 1983, T.l.A.S. No. 10837 [hereinafter Treaty
on Extradition] (cited in Spatola, 925 F.2d at 617).
518. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 618 (citing Treaty on Extradition, supra note 517, art. II).
519. Id. at 617.
520. Id. at 619.
521. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
522. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 619 (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925)).
523. Id. at 618.
524. Id.
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for that of the foreign court. 525 The interests of international comity
require recognition of the foreign conviction as probable cause. 526
Moreover, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding
that the drug smuggling and money laundering offenses for which
Spatola was convicted satisfy the dual criminality requirement of the
Treaty on Extradition. 527 Extradition was thus permissible under the
Treaty on Extradition because the relator's offenses were criminal
under the penal laws of both contracting parties, the U.S. and Italy. 528
X.
A.

MISCELLANEOUS

International Judicial Assistance

1. In re Request For Int'l Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory)
For the Federative Republic of Brazil (General Universal Trading
Corp. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.), 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991);
Evidence may be produced pursuant to a foreign government's letter
rogatory in the absence of a pending adjudicative proceeding in the
foreign state only if such a proceeding is very likely to occur within a
brief interval from the time the request is made.
The Second Circuit's only foray into international judicial assistance during the survey year was in In re Request For International
Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) For the Federative Republic of
Brazil. 529 The case involved motions by Panamanian corporations to
quash a subpoena duces tecum directed to the New York office of
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (Morgan) at the request of a Brazilian prosecutor to compel discovery of records pertaining to the corporations' accounts. s 3o The subpoena arose out of a Brazilian
investigation into the contents of the Panamanian accounts at Morgan
and whether they were the proceeds of illegal activity in Brazil. 531
Congress has authorized the U.S. courts to aid foreign courts in production of evidence necessary to adjudicative proceedings. 532 Not
clear, however, was whether that authorization includes situations
where actual adjudicative proceedings have not yet been com525. Id.
526. Spatola, 925 F.2d at 618.
527. Id. at 619 (citing Treaty on Extradition, supra note 518, art. II). These offenses fall
within the proscriptions under U.S. law against conspiring to traffic narcotics, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(l), 846, 953, 963, and against conspiring to launder money, 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
528. Id.
529. 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
530. Id. at 703.
531. Id.
532. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
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menced. 533 The District Court concluded that assistance could be
rendered so long as proceedings in the foreign tribunal were
"possible. " 534
The Second Circuit reversed. The federal letters rogatory statute
provides that, "[t ]he district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement
or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal . . . ." 535 Prior to amendment in
1964, the statute required that the requested evidence be used in a
"pending" judicial proceeding. 536 The Second Circuit had previously
interpreted the amended version of the statute as not limited to proceedings in conventional courts or tribunals. 537 The authority could
be exercised when the requesting sovereign is exercising an adjudicative function. 538 The deletion of the word "pending" from the statute
in 1964 indicates that its application does not require the foreign adjudication to be pending. 539 The Second Circuit, however, concluded
that the adjudicative proceeding nonetheless must be imminent, i.e.
"very likely to occur and very soon to occur." 540 It is not sufficient
that adjudicative proceedings are "probable" as the District Court
had ruled. Because the Brazilian proceedings in this case were still
investigatory with prosecution only "possible," the evidence in the
record did not satisfy the standards of the statute authorizing judicial
assistance. 541

533. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assitance, 936 F.2d at 705.
534. Id. at 704 (citing Jn re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance, 687 F. Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
535. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1782).
536. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 949 (1948) as amended by Pub. L. No.
73, 63 Stat. 89, 103 (1949)).
537. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assitance, 936 F.2d at 705 (citing Jn re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director oflnspection of the Government oflndia, 385 F.2d 1017, 1019 - 20
(2d Cir. 1967)).
538. Id.
539. Id. at 706.
540. Id.
541. In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance, 936 F.2d at 707.
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